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A STRANGE DISTINCTION: CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY AND CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE IN
PICHER V. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
PORTLAND
Matthew Cobb*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, decided
Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,1 a case that presented an issue of
first impression in Maine: whether the doctrine of charitable immunity2 protected
charitable organizations from liability for intentional torts.3 The court ultimately
held that charitable immunity was not a defense to intentional torts, but that it did
bar negligence claims based on the sexual abuse of a minor.4
In Picher, a majority of the Law Court partly vacated the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment for the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland (Bishop)5 and held
that the doctrine of charitable immunity did not protect the Bishop from liability for
the alleged intentional tort of fraudulent concealment.6 The majority stated three
reasons for its decision: (1) charitable immunity is a discredited doctrine; (2) the
Legislature did not intend to extend the reach of the doctrine to intentional torts
with the enactment of title 14, section 158 of the Maine Revised Statutes in 1965;7
and (3) there is an absence of any convincing public policy reasons for expanding
the scope of the doctrine to cover intentional torts.8 The dissent argued that section
158 did afford protection from liability for intentional torts and that the majority
had “invad[ed] the province of the Legislature” by not maintaining that protection.9
Moreover, the dissent cautioned that as a result of the court’s decision, charitable
institutions would now be compelled to use their funds to defend lawsuits anytime
a plaintiff pled an intentional tort in a cause of action.10
Although the majority reached the proper conclusion in not extending
charitable immunity to cover intentional torts, the court should also have found that
the doctrine did not absolve the Bishop from potential liability for negligent

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.
1. 2009 ME 67, 974 A.2d 286.
2. Charitable immunity in Maine is a common law doctrine that protects charitable institutions
from tort liability. See Thompson v. Mercy Hosp., 483 A.2d 706, 707-09 (Me. 1984).
3. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 10, 974 A.2d at 290.
4. Id. ¶ 1, 974 A.2d at 288.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 10, 974 A.2d at 290.
7. The statute states in relevant part: “A charitable organization shall be considered to have
waived its immunity from liability for negligence or any other tort during the period a policy of
insurance is effective covering the liability of the charitable organization for negligence or any other
tort.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158 (2003).
8. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 29, 974 A.2d at 295.
9. Id. ¶¶ 42-43, 974 A.2d at 299 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at ¶ 41.
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supervision, given the public policy rationale underlying that tort in Maine. This
Note will detail the history of charitable immunity in Maine and will examine how
other jurisdictions have dealt with the immunity. This Note will analyze the Picher
decision, with particular emphasis placed on the policy rationales in both the
majority and dissenting opinions. Moreover, this Note will argue that the
compelling public interest in protecting individuals of limited capacity from the
sexual depredations of persons with power and authority over them is the
underlying rationale for not allowing a charitable organization to escape liability by
pleading the defense of immunity from tort. Finally, this Note will conclude that,
based on that compelling public interest, the majority was correct in not expanding
the scope of charitable immunity to intentional torts, but that the Law Court should
have also carved out an exception to the charitable immunity defense for the tort of
negligent supervision.
II. THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. The History of Charitable Immunity in Maine
Charitable immunity originated in England in the mid-nineteenth century,11
premised on the notion that charitable donations were held in trust by charitable
institutions to be used exclusively for philanthropic purposes, and therefore, should
not be diverted to satisfy tort claims.12 However, this theory was subsequently
overruled and abandoned in England just two decades later.13 Despite the failure of
the doctrine to take root in England, charitable immunity was adopted in the United
States in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital14 and continued to spread
until it was recognized in some form by almost every jurisdiction in the United
States.15
The Law Court, in 1910, established the doctrine of charitable immunity in
Maine with its decision in Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary.16 In that case, the
administrator of Mary Jensen’s estate claimed that the infirmary’s employees were
negligent in not properly monitoring Jensen, who had been suffering from typhoid
fever at the facility, when she fell to her death from an open window.17 The court
held that Jensen’s claim was barred as a matter of law and proclaimed:
No principle of law seems to be better established both upon reason and authority
than that which declares that a purely charitable institution, supported by funds
furnished by private and public charity, cannot be made liable in damages for the
negligent acts of its servants. Were it not so, it is not difficult to discern that
private gift and public aid would not long be contributed to feed the hungry maw
of litigation, and charitable institutions of all kinds would ultimately cease or

11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b. (1979) (explaining the history of
charitable immunity).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 120 Mass. 432 (Mass. 1876).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b. (1979)
16. 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910).
17. Id.
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Charitable immunity remained unchallenged in Maine until the 1960s when it
received increased attention from the courts and the Legislature. In the 1963 case
of Mendall v. Pleasant Mountain Ski Development, Inc.,19 the Law Court was urged
to overrule Jensen.20 The court declined to do so and noted that the Jensen
decision rested upon two principles: “(1) that funds donated for charitable
purposes are held in trust to be used exclusively for those purposes, and (2) that to
permit the invasion of these funds to satisfy tort claims would destroy the sources
of charitable support upon which the enterprise depends.”21 Moreover, the court
maintained that if charitable immunity were to be abolished in Maine, “such a far
reaching change in policy should be initiated in the Legislature.”22 Two years later,
the Legislature enacted 14 M.R.S.A. section 158, which waived a charity’s
immunity for “negligence or any other tort” when a policy of insurance was
effective covering the organization’s liability.23 In 1967, the Law Court interpreted
the significance of that provision for the first time in Rhoda v. Aroostook General
Hospital.24 The court asserted in that case that the language of section 158 was
“tacit recognition that the immunity of charitable institutions from liability for
corporate negligence as well as for the negligence of subordinate employees shall
remain where no insurance coverage is provided.”25 However, that reading of the
statute was used to support the court’s holding that there was no sound reason for
distinguishing between the negligence of a charity’s everyday servants, and that of
its corporate officers in selecting and supervising those servants, when determining
whether charitable immunity was applicable.26
Following these decisions in the 1960s and leading up to Picher, the focus
shifted in charitable immunity cases from arguments against the doctrine itself to
litigation concerning whether organizations were entitled to the defense. For
example, in Thompson v. Mercy Hospital,27 the Law Court reasoned that because
gifts and donations to Mercy Hospital comprised a negligible percentage of its
annual revenues, the policies underlying the doctrine were not implicated and
charitable immunity was therefore not available as a defense.28 Additionally, the
court explained that “[t]he doctrine of charitable immunity is a creation of our
common law. Except for one significant restriction imposed by statute, its
18. Id. at 410-11, 78 A. at 898. It would seem that this declaration by the court was drawing on the
fact that charitable immunity had been adopted in a growing number of US jurisdictions at that point in
time and was ignorant of, or indifferent to, the reality that the doctrine had originally been tried and
abandoned in England nearly half a century earlier.
19. 159 Me. 285, 191 A.2d 633 (1963).
20. Id. at 290, 191 A.2d at 636.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 158 (2003).
24. 226 A.2d 530 (Me. 1967).
25. Id. at 533.
26. Id. at 531.
27. 483 A.2d 706 (Me. 1984).
28. Id. at 707-08. See also Child v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr., 575 A.2d 318 (Me. 1990) (holding that the
nonprofit status of the organization did not entitle it to charitable immunity because less than two
percent of its funds were derived from private contributions).
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applicability in Maine is controlled entirely by the precedents of this Court.”29 On
the other hand, the Law Court found in the 2002 case of Coulombe v. Salvation
Army30 that the profits the Salvation Army had acquired by investing a portion of
its charitable funds were the equivalent of “income from ‘public [or] private
charity,’”31 and because it received more than half its funding from charitable
sources, it was thus entitled to the defense of charitable immunity.32 Despite the
fact that legal arguments in Maine had gravitated away from challenging the
doctrine itself during this time period, almost every other state had
contemporaneously rejected charitable immunity as a defense to liability.
B. Charitable Immunity in Other Jurisdictions
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States no longer recognize
charitable immunity as a defense to tort claims.33 The erosion of the doctrine
began in 1942 with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes.34
In that case, a nurse who worked at the Georgetown Hospital brought a claim for
negligence and contributory negligence against the defendant organization after she
was injured by a swinging door that had been “violently” pushed open by a student
nurse who also worked at the hospital.35 The court began its analysis by noting that
“[f]or negligent or tortious conduct liability is the rule. Immunity is the
exception.”36 It went on to illustrate that under the charitable immunity doctrine,
an individual who continuously pursues charitable work is not protected by the
doctrine, but if he were to form that same charitable enterprise into an organization,
he would be able to avoid liability for the organization’s carelessness.37 The court
found this to be a “strange distinction”38 and one that “reverses the general trend of
responsibility in a risk-sharing and distributing age.”39 Ultimately, the court
condemned the immunity as “out of step with the general trend of legislative and
judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by individuals through the operation
of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than in leaving them wholly to
be borne by those who sustain them.”40 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted
that the widespread availability of insurance at manageable premiums should
assuage those who feared that abandoning the doctrine would deter charitable
donations and eventually lead to the systematic demise of charitable
organizations.41 After this decision by the court of appeals, a number of other

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Thompson, 483 A.2d at 707 (internal citations omitted).
2002 ME 25, 790 A.2d 593.
Id. ¶ 11, 790 A.2d at 596.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979).
130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Id. at 811.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Id.
Georgetown, 130 F.2d at 827.
Id. at 823-24.
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jurisdictions began to follow the Georgetown court’s reasoning in what became a
widespread abolition of the doctrine.42 Currently, thirty-six American jurisdictions
no longer recognize charitable immunity.43
The doctrine has survived in some states through legislative enactments that
have preserved the immunity by limiting the amount of damages that can be
recovered from a charitable organization. For example, after the New Jersey
Supreme Court dissolved charitable immunity in Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear
Infirmary,44 that state’s legislature revived the doctrine.45 The Massachusetts
Legislature imposed a similar restriction, limiting recovery to $20,000 for liability
stemming from charitable activities, but placed no restrictions on damages that
resulted from a charitable organization’s commercial endeavors.46
A small number of American courts have made noticeable modifications to the
doctrine such as limiting the immunity to the protection of charitable trusts and
refusing to extend the scope of the immunity to protect against liability for
intentional torts. In 1952, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in St. Luke’s Hospital
Ass’n v. Long,47 explained that the law in that state concerning charitable immunity
was that the “exemption and protection afforded to a charitable institution is not
immunity from suit . . . but that the protection actually given is to the trust funds
themselves.”48 Similarly, Tennessee’s highest court held in O’Quin v. Baptist
Memorial Hospital49 that a charitable hospital could not completely avoid liability
for the negligence of its servants because the immunity only extended to the
protection of the charitable trust.50
The issue of charitable immunity protection from intentional tort liability was
addressed in 1973 by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Jeffcoat v. Caine.51
In that case, a plaintiff brought a claim of false imprisonment against a charitable
hospital.52 That court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for
the hospital on the basis of charitable immunity and reasoned that none of its past
decisions had contemplated expanding the protection of the doctrine beyond mere
negligence.53 The court emphasized that “we know of no public policy . . . which
would require the exemption of the charity from liability for an intentional tort.”54
Likewise, in 2006 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the statutory
enactment granting immunity to charities in that state reached no further than
protection from claims of ordinary negligence and did not extend to cover
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b. (1979).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 895E, court citations (1982, 1991, 2008).
44. 141 A.2d 276 (N.J. 1958) (holding that the rationale for the doctrine is flawed and outdated and
that judges need not be held back by stare decisis in addressing the needs and responsibilities of modern
society in the realm of tort law).
45. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2000 & 2009-2010).
46. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (West 2000).
47. 240 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1952).
48. Id. at 920 (citations omitted).
49. 201 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1947).
50. Id. at 696.
51. 198 S.E.2d 258 (S.C. 1973).
52. Id. at 259.
53. Id. at 259-60.
54. Id. at 260.
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intentional torts.55
III. THE PICHER DECISION
In Picher, the Law Court was tasked with determining to what extent the
Bishop, as a corporation sole,56 could be held liable for civil claims surrounding the
alleged sexual abuse of a young boy by his priest.57 William Picher attended St.
Mary’s Church and St. Mary’s School in Augusta during the 1980s where he
participated in a number of extracurricular activities.58 It was alleged that from
1986, when Picher was twelve years old, to June 1988, Picher was sexually abused
by Raymond Melville, a priest at St. Mary’s who had been assigned there by the
Bishop.59 In February 2007, Picher filed a complaint against Melville and the
Bishop, including claims against the Bishop for negligent supervision, breach of
fiduciary duty, and canonical agency.60 Melville defaulted, and in January 2008,
after a hearing on damages, a judgment of more than $4 million was entered
against the former priest.61 Subsequently, the Bishop filed a motion for summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense of charitable immunity.62 While the
motion for summary judgment was pending, the trial court granted Picher’s motion
to amend his complaint to include an intentional tort claim against the Bishop for
the alleged fraudulent concealment of information regarding Melville’s prior sexual
improprieties.63 Ultimately, the trial court granted the Bishop’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that charitable immunity covered both intentional and
negligence based torts.64
On appeal, Picher argued that, based on the facts asserted in his claim, the Law
Court should not recognize charitable immunity as a defense to torts related to the
sexual abuse of a minor. Picher first noted that the doctrine leaves the injured party
without a remedy and essentially forces the “innocent victim to bear the burden of
his injuries to protect the perceived benefit to society” derived from the work of
charitable institutions.65 Moreover, Picher maintained that this injustice was most
apparent in the context of intentional torts.66 With respect to the negligent
supervision claim, Picher noted that the court’s decision in Fortin v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland67 had officially recognized the tort under factual
55. Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 902 A.2d 900, 917 (N.J. 2006).
56. The Bishop and his successors in that office are in essence the embodiment of the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland as a corporate entity and as such are subject to all the laws of the State of
Maine. See Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 4 n.2, 871 A.2d at 289.
57. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 974 A.2d at 288.
58. Brief of Appellant William Picher at 1-2, Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2009
ME 67, 974 A.2d 286 (No. KEN-08-81) [hereinafter “Brief of Appellant”].
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2-3.
61. Id. at 3 n.1.
62. See Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 1, 974 A.2d at 288.
63. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 4. Picher maintained that the Bishop had knowledge that
Melville sexually abused a young boy while in seminary in Baltimore, Maryland. Id. at 8.
64. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 6, 974 A.2d at 289.
65. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 24.
66. Id.
67. 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d 1208.
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circumstances substantially similar to this,68 and he asserted that charitable
immunity should not be a defense to acts of negligence that resulted in the sexual
abuse of a minor.69
Conversely, the Bishop argued that the doctrine of charitable immunity in
Maine had been firmly established nearly a century ago and had been reaffirmed as
recently as 2002.70 Thus, the Bishop asserted that if the court reversed the
judgment of the trial court, it would be overruling a long line of its own precedent
and would be ignoring the Legislature’s purported adoption of charitable immunity
in section 158.71 Moreover, the Bishop maintained that the essence of charitable
immunity was the protection of charitable funds from civil judgments, and, as such,
the doctrine was not specific to any particular form of conduct, but rather was
driven by a party’s status as a charitable institution.72 Finally, the Bishop
contended that even if the court abrogated charitable immunity to permit
intentional tort claims, the Bishop, as a corporation sole, could not be held
vicariously liable for the alleged intentional tort of fraudulent concealment because
such actions are considered to be outside the scope of employment.73
A majority of the Law Court upheld charitable immunity as a defense to the
negligent supervision claim against the Bishop, but declined to extend the doctrine
to cover the intentional tort claim of fraudulent concealment.74 Justice Silver,
writing for the majority, stated three reasons for not expanding the doctrine to
cover intentional torts: (1) the doctrine was discredited in almost all other
jurisdictions; (2) section 158 did not expand the scope of the doctrine to cover
intentional torts; and (3) prior decisions by the court had maintained the doctrine,
but refused to expand it.75 The majority declined, however, to determine whether
the Bishop could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort. Instead, the
opinion only went so far as to establish that vicarious liability for the claim of
fraudulent concealment was separate and distinct from vicarious liability for
Melville’s alleged sexual abuse.76 However, because the Bishop did not make any
argument concerning vicarious liability before the trial court, the issue was not
preserved for appeal and the majority therefore did not render a decision on the
issue.77
On the issue of negligent supervision, the majority declined to make an
exception to the charitable immunity protection. Justice Silver explained that the
policy rationale behind the doctrine was the protection of charitable funds and that
68. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 25.
69. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 9, 974 A.2d at 290.
70. Brief of Appellee at 10, Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2009 ME 67, 974 A.2d
286 (No. KEN-08-81) [hereinafter “Brief of Appellee”]. See Jensen, 107 Me. at 410-11, 78 A. at 899
(establishing the doctrine of charitable immunity in Maine); Coulombe, 2002 ME 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 790
A.2d at 595-96 (upholding summary judgment for the Salvation Army on the defense of charitable
immunity because it was a charitable organization).
71. Brief of Appellee, supra note 70, at 16-17.
72. Id. at 35-36.
73. Id. at 37.
74. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 1, 974 A.2d at 288.
75. Id. ¶ 10, 974 A.2d at 290.
76. Id. ¶ 31, 974 A.2d at 296.
77. Id.
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“[a]lthough the rationale itself may be challenged as outdated . . . we would need
persuasive grounds to hold that charitable funds should be protected against certain
types of negligence claims but not others.”78 As a result, the majority’s opinion
affirmed the Bishop’s status as a charitable institution and also determined that the
Bishop had not waived immunity through the purchase of insurance.79
Chief Justice Saufley, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Levy, agreed
that charitable immunity did not extend to intentional torts and focused on the
legislative intent behind section 158 in reaching her conclusion.80 She asserted that
the Legislature, with the enactment of section 158, did “not purport to define or
expand the charitable immunity doctrine.”81 Furthermore, she reasoned that “[i]f
the Legislature had, in fact, engaged in weighing the risks posed by intentional
torts, including the potential sexual assault of children, against the possibility of
destructive litigation costs . . . . one would have expected much more robust debate
and much clearer language.”82
In stark contrast to the majority and concurring opinions, Justice Alexander, in
a dissent joined by Justice Clifford, found that section 158 did protect charities
from intentional tort claims.83 The dissent argued that the phrase “negligence or
any other tort” within the statute was not ambiguous and should be given its plain
meaning: “protection from suit for torts in addition to negligence, including
intentional torts.”84 Moreover, Justice Alexander maintained that the doctrine of
charitable immunity served an important function in allowing for the “continued
existence of many community-based charitable organizations including local
granges, arts organizations, fraternal groups, youth programs, churches, and some
schools and health care providers.”85 He warned that, as a result of the court’s
opinion, any one of those organizations would now be forced to expend their
charitable funds to defend lawsuits through trial any time a plaintiff included an
intentional tort claim in their cause of action, effectively ending charitable
immunity in Maine.86
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Negligent Supervision in Maine
Negligent supervision was first officially recognized as a cause of action in
Maine four years before the Picher decision, in Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland.87 Prior to Fortin, the status of Maine’s negligent supervision law in both
78. Id. ¶ 9, 974 A.2d at 290.
79. Id. ¶¶ 33-39, 974 A.2d at 296-98. The court reasoned that because the insurance policy (as
interpreted by the court) did not cover acts related to sexual misconduct, the Bishop had no insurance
coverage for claims being asserted by Picher. Id. ¶¶ 36-39, 974 A.2d at 297-98.
80. Id. ¶ 58, 975 A.2d at 302 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).
81. Id. ¶ 60.
82. Id.
83. See id. ¶ 42, 974 A.2d at 299 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
84. Id. ¶ 55, 974 A.2d at 301.
85. Id. ¶ 46, 974 A.2d at 299-300.
86. Id. ¶ 41, 974 A.2d at 299.
87. 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d 1208.
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secular and religious contexts had been clouded in uncertainty,88 and the Law Court
notably had declined to recognize the tort in ecclesiastical settings on several prior
occasions.89 However, these decisions were made before revelations concerning
widespread sexual abuse and institutional cover-up within the Catholic Church
received national attention in 2002.90 Interestingly, the factual circumstances in
Fortin were almost identical to those presented in Picher.91 In Fortin, the Law
Court allowed a claim of negligent supervision to proceed against the Bishop92 and
emphasized that “societal interests are at their zenith” when a situation involves the
protection of a child from sexual abuse. 93 Moreover, the court explained that the
context of the relationship in which the alleged abuse took place provided further
justification for the imposition of a high civil duty.94 Justice Levy observed that
“[a] child who is both a student and an altar boy is subject to the supervision,
control, and authority of the Diocese on a daily basis”95 and that Fortin had alleged
the existence of a “special relationship that ineluctably involved the actual
placement of trust, as well as a substantial disparity in power and influence
between him and the Diocese” that “[b]y its very nature . . . renders a child
vulnerable to the possibility of abuse at the hands of a miscreant employee.”96 The
court further explained that the Bishop’s duty to protect did not exist simply by
virtue of Fortin’s status as a student and altar boy, but also required the assertion
that the Bishop “knew or should have known of the risk of harm posed by the priest
who abused Fortin.”97 The court observed that this duty was “closely connected to
an independent statutory duty[:] As the administrator of a school, the [Bishop] has
been obligated since 1975 to report to civil authorities information that a child has
88. See id. ¶¶ 18-20, 871 A.2d at 1215-16 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the status of
negligent supervision in Maine prior to the Fortin decision); Sonia J. Buck, Note, Church Liability for
Clergy Sexual Abuse: Have Time and Events Overthrown Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland?, 57 ME. L. REV. 259 (2005) (arguing that the status of negligent supervision in Maine was
uncertain and that it needed to be clarified in light of the church abuse scandal).
89. See Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, ¶ 1, 802 A.2d 391, 391-92
(affirming dismissal of the case on factual grounds without deciding the negligent supervision question);
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 22, 738 A.2d 839, 847
(avoiding the negligent supervision issue by finding that the tortfeasor was neither an agent or employee
of the church defendant); Swanson, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 13, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (acknowledging that it was
unclear whether or not negligent supervision was a recognized cause of action in Maine, but assumed
that even if it was, the claim would be barred by First Amendment issues under the factual
circumstances).
90. See Martin Kasindorf et al., Boston Church Scandal Starts Chain Reaction, USA TODAY, Dec.
19, 2002, at A13 (explaining that the media coverage of the Boston clergy abuse scandal in 2002
sparked a nationwide reaction).
91. William Picher and Michael Fortin, as minors, both attended St. Mary’s Church and St. Mary’s
school in Augusta, where they were allegedly sexually abused by their priest, Raymond Melville, who
had been assigned to the church and the school. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 1; Brief of
Appellant Michael Fortin at 1, Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d
1208 (No. KEN-04-072) [hereinafter “Brief of Appellant Fortin”].
92. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 76, 871 A.2d at 1232.
93. Id. ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230.
94. Id. ¶ 34, 871 A.2d at 1220.
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 37, 871 A.2d at 1222.
97. Id. at ¶ 38.
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been or is likely to be abused.”98
Ultimately, the Law Court held that if a plaintiff alleged the existence of a
special relationship,99 an action could be maintained against a defendant for
negligent supervision in accordance with section 317 of the Second Restatement of
Torts.100 The policy rationale at the heart of the Fortin decision was the protection
of children from sexual abuse. This was most clearly demonstrated in the court’s
recognition that “[t]he profundity of the individual and social harm resulting from
the sexual abuse of children and society’s interest in responding to the same
requires little discussion.”101 Although the issue of charitable immunity was not
raised in Fortin, this unconditional principal articulated by the court should have
militated against the majority’s holding in Picher that charitable immunity barred
all negligence based claims, even those relating to the sexual abuse of a minor.
B. Exception to Charitable Immunity for Negligent Supervision
Given the compelling public interest advanced in Fortin of protecting children
from sexual abuse at the hands of trusted members of the clergy, an exception to
the charitable immunity doctrine should be recognized under Maine law for
negligent supervision. It is perplexing that the Picher Court dismissed Picher’s
negligent supervision claim under factual circumstances almost identical to those
presented in Fortin by stating that there were no “persuasive grounds to hold that
charitable funds should be protected against certain types of negligence claims but
not others.”102 The nature of a negligent supervision claim, as crafted by the Fortin
opinion, distinguishes that tort from everyday accident-based negligence claims in
98. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 63, 871 A.2d at 1229 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011A(1)(A)(13) (2004 & Supp. 2009-2010)).
99. See Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 2009 ME 51, ¶¶ 17-19, 971 A.2d 310, 315-16 (discussing
the nature of a special relationship as it pertains to a claim of negligent supervision and explaining that
“those fiduciary relationships in which there exists a great disparity of position and influence between
the parties would qualify as a special relation” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) (explaining that there is generally no duty to control a
third party from causing physical harm to another absent a special relationship that creates a duty to
protect the other person).
100. Section 317 describes an employer’s duty to control his or her employee in a negligent
supervision cause of action:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting
outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others
or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his
servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, ¶ 7, 802 A.2d 391, 393 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)).
101. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230.
102. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 9, 974 A.2d at 290.
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that it involves a betrayal of trust placed in a superior party by a vulnerable party103
rather than a breach of a duty to act with reasonable care in order to avoid injuring
a stranger. This consideration becomes even more important in clergy sexual abuse
cases because “the Church places priests in a position of ultimate trust and
authority over parishioners. In particular, children, with their absolute faith and
trust, are strongly conditioned to obey priests.”104
The Picher Court has, in effect, placed the policy of protecting charitable
funds, and the benefits that the public recoups from them, above the right of a
sexual abuse victim to seek compensation from an entity that breached its duty to
protect that individual from the potential harm posed by a pedophilic priest. This
result cannot be reconciled with the majority’s pronouncement in Fortin that
“societal interests are at their zenith” when a situation involves the protection of a
child from sexual abuse. 105 Forcing a child who has been sexually abused to bear
the full burden of that injury in the hopes that society as a whole will continue to
receive the benefits from charitable institutions is fundamentally unjust and, as the
court of appeals noted in Georgetown, is “out of step with the general trend of
legislative and judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by individuals through
the operation of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than in leaving
them wholly to be borne by those who sustain them.”106
Other jurisdictions have made similar exceptions to the charitable immunity
doctrine through judicial opinion and by legislative enactment. For example, the
Supreme Court of Virginia in J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church107 allowed a
plaintiff to recover against a church that negligently hired an employee who had
been previously convicted of aggravated sexual assault108 by holding that “the
independent tort of negligent hiring operates as an exception to the charitable
immunity of religious institutions.”109 Likewise, the New Jersey Legislature
amended its charitable immunity statute in 2006 to make it clear that charitable
immunity does “not apply to a claim in any civil action that the negligent hiring,
supervision or retention of an employee, agent or servant resulted in a sexual
offense being committed” against a minor who was a beneficiary of the charitable
organization.110
C. Why the Bishop’s Liability Should Not Be Limited to Intentional Torts
Limiting a charitable entity’s liability to intentional torts poses numerous
challenges to a sexual abuse victim’s ability to recover damages, especially in an
ecclesiastical setting. For example, as the majority noted in Picher, in order for the
103. See Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 37, 871 A.2d at 1222.
104. Kelly W.G. Clark, Kristian Spencer Roggendorf & Peter B. Janci, Of Compelling Interest: The
Intersection of Religious Freedom and Civil Liability in the Portland Priest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 OR. L.
REV. 481, 511 (2006) (a detailed discussion and demonstration of the challenging issues that arise in the
litigation of clergy sexual abuse cases).
105. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230.
106. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
107. 372 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1988).
108. Id. at 394.
109. Id.
110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.4 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009-2010).
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plaintiff to succeed on an intentional tort claim of fraudulent concealment, he
would need to establish, in part, that the Bishop failed to disclose a material fact
with the subjective “intention of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting in
reliance on the non-disclosure.”111 Establishing actual subjective intent on the part
of the Bishop to mislead the victim is much more difficult than establishing the
objective standard imposed by the tort of negligent supervision, which requires a
showing that the Bishop “knew or should have known of the risk of harm posed by
the priest who abused [the victim].”112 Thus, as a result of the Picher decision, if
Child A is sexually abused by the agent of a for-profit corporation and Child B is
sexually abused by the agent of a charitable organization, Child B will need to
prove more than Child A to recover for the same injury. This substantial increase
in the burden of proof necessary to recover from a charitable organization is
unwarranted given the policy arguments outlined above. Moreover, a showing of
subjective intent to mislead a sexual abuse victim may be even harder to prove in
the context of clergy sexual abuse because the supervising bishop in many cases
may not believe, personally, that a priest who has abused children in the past is
likely to abuse children in the future.113 Further complicating such a situation is the
possibility that a supervising bishop may hold a “sincere religious belief that God
could and would change” the abusive priest.114
V. CONCLUSION
The Law Court, in Picher, refused to extend the scope of charitable immunity
to cover intentional torts, but declined to abrogate the doctrine for claims of
negligent supervision. In doing so, the court was attempting to provide the sexual
abuse victim in the case with a means by which to recover from the Bishop while at
the same time remaining deferential to past precedent and the Legislature.
However, as a result of the court’s reluctance to provide an exception to charitable
immunity for the tort of negligent supervision, sexual abuse victims who seek to
recover against the Bishop, or other charitable organizations, face a much higher
burden than those seeking recovery against for-profit entities in that they will be
limited to pleading and proving an intentional tort claim. As the dissent noted in
Picher, intentional tort claims, such as fraudulent concealment, are “easily pled, but
difficult to prove.”115
The Law Court has declared that “societal interests are at their zenith” when a
situation involves protecting a child from sexual abuse. 116 The Picher Court
ignored that declaration in declining to create an exception to the charitable
111. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 30, 974 A.2d at 295 (emphasis added). The court explained that
[t]he elements of fraudulent concealment are: (1) a failure to disclose; (2) a material fact;
(3) where a legal or equitable duty to disclose exists; (4) with the intention of inducing
another to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the non-disclosure; and (5) which is in
fact relied upon to the aggrieved party’s detriment.
Id. (citations omitted).
112. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 38, 871 A.2d at 1222 (emphasis added).
113. See Clark, Roggendorf & Janci, supra note 104, at 495.
114. Id.
115. Picher, 2009 ME 67, ¶ 56, 974 A.2d at 301 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
116. Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 67, 871 A.2d at 1230.
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immunity doctrine for negligent supervision under the facts presented in that case.
The Law Court should have made such an exception and reemphasized that the
doctrine of charitable immunity is a creation of its own jurisprudence117 and that
other than “one significant restriction imposed by statute, its applicability in Maine
is controlled entirely by the precedents of [the Law] Court.”118 With regards to that
restriction, it is also important to note that section 158 was enacted forty years
before the court recognized negligent supervision as a cause of action and decades
before revelations about the clergy sexual abuse scandal came to light. Its
application to present day cases must reflect these realities. Perhaps above all else,
the court should have been mindful that religious “institutions teaching divine
justice, the dignity of man and his obligations to his fellowmen . . . would not claim
on the basis of their teachings that they ought to be exempt from repairing the
injury done by themselves or their agents to another.”119

117. Thompson, 483 A.2d at 707 (Me. 1984).
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 121 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Wis. 1963) (a decision that
abolished charitable immunity for religious institutions in Wisconsin).

